Synthesis

At the beginning of this course, I defined what I felt was Communication Justice as “the right for all persons to express themselves and their opinions (written, orally, or visually) without fear of persecution in order to promote equality (and in doing so, justice) in society”. I still stand by this definition and believe that the language I used has allowed for the occasional fluctuation over what speech is protected and what speech is punished. Communication Justice does not translate directly to “free speech” rights; rather I feel that free speech is both a motivator and a result of this. The clause “in order to promote equality” is the primary basis for freedom of speech. Our ability to express our opinions, even if controversial, must exist so that we all have a voice in society. When something is expressed, however, that compromises others’ rights to this same equality; restrictions should be in place to protect them. This is why I argued that hate speech does not deserve the same amount of protection. The case that first raised this issue was concerning the Westboro Baptist Church. The WBC, as I discussed in that post, is entirely protected in their speech and actions. I felt that some of their messages were explicitly hateful, and argued that they hindered social progress and the ability of historically marginalized groups to express themselves. Because I feel that their messages hurt society as a whole, and no US case or law would prosecute them, I looked to Germany and their criminal code. The WBC would be prosecutable under Agitation of the People (section 130) which makes it illegal to “publicly incite hatred against parts of the population or … to insult, maliciously slur or defame them in a manner violating their (constitutionally protected) human dignity.” I believe that the US would do well adopting a similar law to ensure that all people can maintain their dignity and –equally- maintain the right to free speech.

In reviewing my previous postings, I also find that my initial citations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are key proponents of my reasoning even if not explicitly stated. I still believe that everyone has the right to express their opinion, regardless of location or if it is controversial. I am not an absolutist, as in both my second blog and my third blog I argue that restrictions need to be in place. This is more true in the discussion over Westboro. With the FCC, I argued that they have too many restrictions and that possibly the only ones needed are during the times that material is specifically intended toward children. When re-reading this, I think it is unlikely that the producers of children’s content would put any offensive material up, so rather than restrictions I think that the current ratings systems (GA, G, PG, etc) should do. I believe that no content should be restricted, but that audiences should be informed of what the material contains before choosing to watch the program. I also noticed that in response to my decision to overturn FCC v Pacifica and FCC v Fox, a question was asked, which was if I really expected parents to constantly monitor the programs their children are viewing, and to explain why questionable content should not be used if it comes up. I cite Justice Harlan in his ruling of Cohen v. California “we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.” I absolutely feel that it is the parents, not the governments, responsibility to monitor their children. This also leads me to my firm belief in UDHR’s Article 19, that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

I would like to say that I am a sole advocate for strict scrutiny, and that government must prove it has a compelling reason to regulate or punish the speech. However, I introduced intermediate scrutiny where only substantial reason was necessary in several responses and when I felt it would allow me (acting as a justice) to “win” my case (Westboro). To an extent, this carries over into the various philosophers we have covered – at various times I applied Meiklejohn, Mill, Haiman, Emerson, or Chafee. Although it was not always clear in my posts, possibly even less so with responses, I feel like my philosophy most closely aligns with Mill. John Stuart Mill protects nearly all speech, and proposes limits only if harm seems imminent. This requires that the only power to restrict speech happens if it is done to prevent harm to others. He further distinguishes harm as legitimate and illegitimate. When speech causes a direct and clear violation of rights, then it can be limited, making the restriction legitimate. In his corn dealer example, he says it is acceptable to claim that corn dealers starve the poor if such a view is expressed through the medium of the printed page. It is not acceptable to gather an angry mob who feels the same way in front of the corn dealer’s house. This may cause harm to the corn dealer and this form of expression is likely to result in an outburst or other type of instigation. Mill, although he would not be enough to restrict Westboro, paints a similar picture to what I see happening. In protesting the funerals of soldiers, in visible areas close to the funeral itself, I feel that WBC is very much like the starving mob. It is only a matter of time until the corn dealer feels threatened or angered and goes to talk to the mob, just as if it is only a matter of time until a griever speaks out against this sort of protest and emotions are high. I like the way Mill phrases this limitation to say the “only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” A key distinction for me is that I strongly feel the speech must be leading to or inciting harm to warrant restrictions. Any form of speech that can be proven harmful should not be protected. This requires the “clear and present danger” test in order to demonstrate the material can actually cause harm.

I also still believe what I cited in my first post concerning blasphemous speech in Afghanistan, and argue that free speech and free religion go hand in hand. The ruling in Burstyn v Wilson says, “It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.” Much of my personal beliefs stem for the first part of that, when it says it is not the business of government to suppress real or imagined attacks. However, the potential that something will incite or cause harm does require the government to intervene. In my final post, I discussed how the depiction of animal violence does propagate the harming of innocent beings. Therefore, the depiction of violence towards animals should be criminalized because I believe it has the potential to cause harm and incite immediate harm towards animals. For this same reason, I would criminalize child porn that fits the definitions under the proposed revisions I gave in my responses. This means that if the speech harms, even if it harms a child’s innocence or sense of worth (as with the pornography issue), or harms another being, some form of restrictive action needs to be taken.